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Abstract Using environmental, social and governance scores compiled by Reuters Datastream for 
each company’s corporate social performance (CSP), we examine the relationship between CSP and 
corporate financial performance (CFP) of 314 UK listed companies over the period 2002–
2015.Wefurther evaluate the relationship between prior and subsequent CFP and prior and 
subsequent CSP. Based on the system-GMM estimation method, we provide direct evidence that 
suggests that while CFP and CSP can be linked linearly; however, when we examine the impact of 
CSP on CFP, the association is more non-linear (cubic) than linear. Our results suggest that firms 
periodically adjust their level of commitment to society, in order to meet their target CSP. The 
primary contributions of this paper are testing (1) the non-monotonous relationship between CSP 
and CFP, (2) the lagged relationship between the two and the optimality of CSP levels, and (3) the 
presence of a virtuous circle. Our results further suggest that CSP contributes to CFP better during 
post-crisis years. Our findings are robust to year-onyear changes in CFP and CSP, financial versus 
non-financial firms, and the intensity of corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement across 
industries. 
1 Introduction 
The extant literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR, hereafter) presents a broader view of 
the firm as an entity that should consider its relationships with stakeholders and not just with 
shareholders. Freeman (1984) notes that if stakeholders are able to voice their concerns, the socially 
responsible behaviour of a firm may minimise externalities and maximize synergies in their 
relationships with stakeholders. As a result of this pressure from stakeholders, including government 
and the public, several firms now report on their ethical, social and environmental conduct. Firms 
are beginning to take ‘green’ issues very seriously and are minimizing their negative impact on the 
environment (see Martın-de Castro et al. 2015).1 This, coupled with pressure on firms from various 
stakeholders (see Fieseler 2011) to invest more in socially responsible projects, highlights the need 
to investigate whether a relationship exists between corporate social performance (CSP, hereafter) 
and corporate financial performance (CFP, hereafter), given that the latter remains an important 
goal for the firm. If a positive association is found to exist between CSP and CFP, it will increase the 
need for corporations to commit more resources to improve CSR. However, if a negative relationship 
exists between CSP and CFP, corporations will be less receptive to calls from stakeholders to invest 
in socially responsible activities. Therefore, this paper examines whether CSP has any varying impact 
on CFP by also considering the direction of causation, and the non-linear and dynamic associations. 
Does it really pay for a company to be green? This is a very important question, yet unresolved issue, 
despite previous scholarly attention (see Wang et al. 2015). For over three decades, academics have 
empirically investigated the potential link between CSP and CFP (see Cochran and Wood 1984; 
Aupperle et al. 1985; Stanwick and Stanwick 1998; Barnett and Salomon 2006, 2012; Galbreath 
2016; Wu et al. 2017). For instance, Tosun (2017) finds that at fund-level, socially responsible firms 
underperform the market when there is more investment in high CSR firms. However, Filbeck et al. 
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(2013) show that CSR constructed portfolios experience better performance. The arguments for and 
against corporate social initiatives have motivated researchers to examine the CSP–CFP in different 
countries, beyond the USA, where studies on the subject have been traditionally contextualized 
(Ullmann 1985). Also, a vast body of literature has examined the CSP–CFP relationship in different 
business sectors and in different countries. For instance, Simpson and Kohers (2002) investigated the 
CSP–CFP relationship in the banking industry; Gregory and Whittaker (2007) also analyzed the CSP of 
‘ethical’ unit trusts in the UK, while in more recent times Li et al. (2013) examined whether firms’ 
performance affects CSR disclosure in China. 
Despite the very useful contributions of these papers, a general consensus has not yet been reached. 
Friedman (1970) argues that CSR actions incur costs with no returns. Preston and O’Bannon (1997) 
suggest that a negative or neutral relationship exists between CSP and CFP, and that a link exists 
between past CFP and resulting CSP. There seems to be a general disagreement in the literature on 
the question of whether CSP adds value to firm performance. Academics in recent times have taken 
a contrasting view to suggest that firms do have other responsibilities than maximising shareholders 
profits (see Flammer 2015 and Wang et al. 2015). Thus, they point out that firms can benefit 
financially from investing in CSR projects which can be demonstrated to their stakeholders through 
effective communication, for example, CSR reporting. Indeed, proponents of a positive CSP–CFP link 
suggest that the term ‘socially responsible’ does not necessarily mean that firms have to reduce 
profits when adopting CSR policies. They argue that firms with better CFP can meet their social 
responsibilities, and the greater their profits, the greater their ability to be socially responsible 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995; Freeman 1984). This argument is generally anchored on the slack 
resources theory, which predicts that information intensity regarding ethical and moral issues 
influence consumers’ brand attitude and buying intentions (Schuler and Cording 2006). This may 
imply that companies improve their CSP to sustain future sales. Brammer and Millington (2008), 
Nelling and Webb (2009) and Scholtens (2008b) have also examined the causality of any link 
between CSR and CFP. Simpson and Kohers (2002) and Cochran and Wood (1984) argue that whilst 
the CSP–CFP link is ambiguous and difficult to measure, both companies and stakeholders would 
benefit from a better understanding of this relationship. In fact, if a relationship between CSP and 
CFP could be found, clarification surrounding the exact purpose, nature, role and responsibilities of a 
firm may be reached. Given that this is an unresolved issue in the literature, this study seeks to 
empirically address this important issue. 
In doing this, we specifically differentiate our study from the existing studies with regard to data and 
methods: first, the study utilizes a robust and well-established index, ESG (environmental, social and 
governance) scores, provided by Thomson Reuters, which takes account of the multidimensional 
aspects of CSP. We are not aware of any other published work that has used this data in the CSP/CFP 
context. Furthermore, we use the system-GMM estimation technique, which accounts for the 
endogeneity problem as a result of the random shocks influencing both CSP and CFP and their 
determinants simultaneously, using recent panel data of 314 UK firms for the period 2002–2015.2 
GMM also controls for unobserved firm heterogeneity, and provides the short-term and long-term 
relationship between the two factors. This technique also enables us to address the presence of a 
possible ‘virtuous circle’, which suggests that a higher CSP leads to higher CFP via the strategic use of 
CSR, and vice versa (Waddock and Graves 1997). Moreover, Short et al. (2015) argue that CSP—
being a major aspect of CFP—has been under studied empirically. We thus aim to fill the gap in the 
literature as we study the determinants of CSP. 
 
The uniqueness and contributions of this paper therefore come from two main aspects. First, relying 
on perspectives from the slack resources theory and the optimality of the CSP literature, we 
empirically examine the presence of non-linear (parabolic and cubic) relationships between CSP and 
CFP. This is an important, yet unresolved issue in the literature (Lankoski 2008; Elsayed and Paton 
2009; Barnea and Rubin 2010; Barnett and Salomon 2006, 2012). Second, we introduce a partial 
adjustment process to investigate the possibility of companies adjusting the intensity of CSR 
activities for internal and external developments. This is important, given the large and growing 
CSP–CFP literature that refers to such a possibility as ‘social responsiveness’ (McWilliams and Siegel 
2001; Brammer and Millington 2008). Through our methodology, we consider this possibility in an 
estimation model by adopting the partial adjustment process. To the best of our knowledge, no 
empirical study has examined this aspect of the CSP–CFP nexus. 
 
Our study also contributes to the CSP and CFP literature in five unique ways. First, we hypothesize, 
and find direct evidence consistent with the linear relation between CFP and CSP. Second, by 
incorporating two strands of literature on finance and CSR, we find a non-linear (cubic) association 
between CSP and CFP, suggesting that firms regularly adjust their levels of commitment to society to 
meet their CSR targets. Third, we find that the speed of a firm’s adjustment to the targeted CSP level 
is higher in the non-financial UK firms. Fourth, we split our sample into two sub-periods, pre-crisis 
(2002–2008) and post-crisis (2009–2015) to analyse whether any potential CSR practice change 
stemming from the global financial crisis influences the CSP and CFP link: our additional analyses 
reveal that the positive impact of CSP on CFP is more salient during the post-crisis years and for both 
periods we report the existence of optimal CSP levels and non-linear association between CSP and 
CFP.3 Finally, we clarify the implications of wide variations in the degree of CSP intensity across 
industries. We find evidence supporting the notion that firms in industries with low CSR engagement 
find it beneficial to increase their current CSP so as to enhance current CFP. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature and 
hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and 
results. Section 5 concludes the paper and offer suggestions for future studies. 
 
2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
CSR has become a global phenomenon, which continues to shape and influence discourse, policies 
and practices (Scherer and Palazzo 2011; Amaeshi et al. 2016). Existing studies offer several 
definitions of CSR, which leaves the construct ambiguous (Henderson 2001; Windsor 2001; van 
Marrewijk 2003). Summarising prior studies, we argue that CSR-responsive firms will advance social 
good (McWilliams and Siegel 2001), use legal and ethical means to earn profit (Carroll, 1991), 
minimise adverse environmental and social impact (European Commission 2011; Amaeshi et al. 
2016). This broad understanding of CSR enables firms to balance the needs of stakeholders. Thus the 
issue of commitment to financially rewarding shareholders and notions of equity and fairness to 
other stakeholders (Adegbite and Nakajima 2011; Deakin and Whittaker 2007) may offer financial 
benefits to firms. It is from this CSR understanding that we explore the relation between CSP and 
CFP. 
 
2.1 The non-linearity between CSP and CFP 
Do firms that are socially responsible experience better financial performance (a positive 
association) relative to their competitors who are non-responsive (a negative association)? Robinson 
et al. (2011) find a significant increase in the market share of firms that are added to the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index. A large body of literature on CSP and CFP mainly assumes a causal relationship 
between CFP and CSP (see McWilliams and Siegel 2000 and Waddock and Graves 1997). However, 
the association may be non-linear. For instance, CFP can improve with higher CSP up to a certain 
point, and then deteriorates as a result of the diminishing benefits of excessive commitment to CSR 
resulting in a reverse U-shaped relationship (Barnea and Rubin 2010). Another viewpoint is that it 
may be irrational for companies to engage in CSR as they may have to sacrifice financial resources 
earmarked for projects with positive net present values to pursue CSR, whilst their competitors, who 
argue that it does not pay to engage in CSR, will have sufficient funds to undertake projects with 
positive net present values. Existing studies show a U-shaped relation (see Barnett and Salomon 
2006; Brammer and Millington 2008). Furthermore, Lankoski’s (2008) model demonstrates an 
inverted-U relationship between CSR outcomes and economic performance, such that as the 
marginal costs of CSR activities increase, the marginal revenues decline.4 Porter’s (1980) and Porter 
and Kramer’s (2002) competitive advantage arguments suggest that corporations following 
differentiation or low-cost policies are more likely to perform better than their counterparts. This 
implies a cubic link for firms with moderate (low or high) CSP would have lower (higher) CFP. A 
recent study by Barnett and Salomon (2012) highlights the importance of considering a U-shaped 
link between CSP and CFP since some firms may not adequately generate positive returns, despite 
having significant investment in CSR. 
 
We anchor our paper on the slack resources theory, which implies that prior high levels of CFP may 
allow managers a greater amount of slack resources to invest in CSR activities (Ullmann 1985; 
Waddock and Graves 1997). As CSP depends to some extent on a manager’s individual discretion, 
the initiation or cancellation of environmental policies may depend greatly on the amount of 
resources available to managers (McGuire et al. 1988). Waddock and Graves (1997) argue that firms 
with better CFP history tend to have higher current levels of CSR, and that raising CSR levels in turn 
results in stronger CFP. This is termed a ‘virtuous circle’. Orlitzky (1998) concluded that better CSP is 
both a predictor and the consequence of a stronger CFP, which is consistent with Waddock and 
Graves’ (1997) findings of a virtuous circle. 
 
A firm with a strong CSP may implement implicit contracts which may improve CFP and reduce 
variability in performance measures. However, if CSR is viewed as a considerable cost, firms with 
strong past CFP may be more willing to incur these costs in the future. Conversely, firms with poor 
past CFP may be less willing to incur these costs in the future. This time lagged analysis is consistent 
with Waddock and Graves (1997) who used time lags to test between prior and subsequent CSP and 
prior and subsequent CFP. Jo et al. (2015) report that the reducing environmental costs take about 2 
years before they improve profitability. Furthermore, adopting both CSP and CFP interchangeably as 
dependent and explanatory variables is consistent with Scholtens (2008b) who examined the 
causality between the CSP–CFP nexus and showed that the direction of causation runs from CFP to 
CSP. 
 
The combination of the two hypotheses implies that CFPt−2 improves CSPt−1, and subsequently 
enhances CFP t . Examining these interrelationships help to test for the presence of a virtuous circle. 
This extends the work of Shahzad and Sharfman (2015), who considered a lagged analysis by 
showing that the direction of causality runs from CSP to CFP. 
 
2.2 The optimality of CSP 
Firms aim to maximise CFP but not necessarily CSP. Guo et al. (2016) find that corporate culture 
disclosure improves financial performance. On the other hand, a firm’s innovation strategy could 
influence its CSP performance by reducing environmental impacts and improving health and safety 
(Pavelin and Porter 2008). As the literature on the optimality of CSP implies (see e.g., Barnea and 
Rubin 2010; Elsayed and Paton 2009; Fernandez-Kranz and Santalo 2010; Salzmann 2008), there are 
costs and benefits of being socially responsible in a competitive business environment. Brammer et 
al. (2006) argue that investment in social activities destroy shareholders’ wealth. Nevertheless, 
Scholtens (2008a)—using an alternative framework for assessing CSR—shows that CSP within the 
banking sector improved significantly between 2000 and 2005. A recent study by Nollet et al. (2016) 
finds a positive association between CSP and CFP after investment up to a certain threshold has 
been met. McWilliams and Siegel (2001) propose that managers trade-off the demand for CSR 
against the cost of CSR activities. They suggest that an optimal CSR level can be identified. Lankoski 
(2000) argues that firms that deviate from optimal CSP level may experience a lower CFP. Salzmann 
(2008) finds this relationship intuitively appealing given that excessively improving the CSP (for 
example, aiming for carbon neutrality) is extremely costly and would certainly reduce a firm’s CFP. 
This may explain why various empirical studies have failed to find either a positive or negative 
association between CSP and CFP. Lankoski (2008) argues that some exogenous factors (e.g., 
technology, definition of stakeholderism) may evolve over time and thereby change the CSR-related 
costs. Wang and Choi (2013) emphasize the relevance of consistency in social performance over time 
when examining the CSP–CFP link. Therefore, as discussed in Aupperle et al. (1985) and Ullmann 
(1985), it may be feasible for firms to optimize the intensity of their CSR by trading-off the benefits 
against the costs. Gregory and Whittaker (2007) examine the performance of ethical unit trusts in 
the UK and report that the findings are sensitive to whether static or time-varying models are 
adopted. Therefore, to empirically test for the presence of a possible optimal CSR level, we adopt 
the following partial adjustment process: we assume that a company  i has a desired level of CSR for 
time t ( CSP∗it), which is determined by x explanatory variables. 
CSP∗it=∑k=1δkxkit+πit 
(1) 
where x is a vector of k explanatory variables; πit is a serially correlated disturbance term with a 
mean of zero and possibly heteroscedastic; and δk’s are unknown estimable parameters. The model 
assumes that companies adjust their current CSR structure (CSP it ) according to the degree of 
adjustment coefficient ‘α’, to obtain the target CSR structure: 
CSPit−CSPit−1=α(CSP∗it−CSPit−1) 
(2) 
The actual change will be equal to the desired change when α = 1. No adjustments are made in the 
case of α = 0, suggesting that either the lagged level is the target level, or the adjustment cost is 
higher than the cost of remaining off target. By combining (1) and (2) we obtain: 
CSPit=(1−α)CSPit−1+∑k=1αδkxkit+απit 
(3) 
Equation (3) assumes that α lies between 0 and 1. If the cost of being in disequilibrium is higher 
(lower) than the cost of adjustment, then α converges to one (zero).5 We examine the presence of 
adjusting the level of CSR activities to achieve the target CSP level. Clearly, drawing on evidence of 
CFP and a time-varying degree of CSR, we test the following three hypotheses. 
 
H1 
CSP is positively associated with CFP. 
 
H2 
Prior CFP (CSP) will have a positive impact on subsequent CSP (CFP). 
 
H3 
Firms dynamically adjust the level of CSR activities to maintain their target CSP. 
 
3 Data 
We use an unbalanced panel data of 314 UK firms over the period 2002-2015. All company financials 
and share price data were collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream6 and CSP data were 
collected from Thomson Reuters “Asset4” module. After the standard data filtering (e.g., deleting 
firms with missing data, as well as inconsistent and extreme values of variables), we restricted our 
sample size to 314 companies with 3240 firm-years between them. Given our adopted adjustment 
process, this large sample size helps us to provide a robust analysis. 
 
3.1 Corporate social performance 
The measures used in prior related empirical studies have frequently been one-dimensional, lacked 
clarity and have been applied to small samples of companies. As highlighted by Sheehy (2015) and 
Siegel and Vitaliano (2007), among others, there is a clear need for a multidimensional measure 
applied across a wide range of industries and larger samples. An overall measure of CSP is extremely 
difficult due to its complexity and because just one CSP measurement provides a limited perspective 
on how well a firm is socially performing. 
 
We construct our CSP measure by utilizing detailed social performance data from Thomson Reuters 
Asset4 in Datastream. We measure CSP for each firm-year by using seven equally weighted 
dimensions which consist of employment quality, health and safety, training and development, 
diversity, human rights, community, and product responsibility. The variables are normalized on a 
scale of 100. Therefore, CSP is between 0% (lower commitment to CSR activities) and 100% (higher 
commitment to CSR activities). Moreover, the emphasis of our study is on social performance of 
companies and hence we did not include ESG’s corporate governance components (i.e., board 
structure, board function, compensation policy, shareholder rights and vision and strategy) for our 
CSP construct, which are available from Thomson Reuters Datastream currently for over 4300 global 
companies. Similarly, Liang and Renneboog (2017) used only the environmental (E) component of 
the ESG scores when their empirical focus is corporate environmental responsibility.7 
 
3.2 Corporate financial performance 
Studies using accounting-based measures for CFP have generally found a positive relationship 
between CSP and CFP (see Cochran and Wood 1984). Studies such as these are influenced by 
performance measurement types, as each type focuses on different aspects with their own biases. 
Another limitation is that they do not control for differences in risk. Ullmann (1985) argues that 
accounting-based measures should be adjusted for risk and industry characteristics. However, other 
studies have used market-based performance measures to examine the relationship between CFP 
and CSP which reflect investors’ perceptions of firms’ ability to generate future profits rather than 
using past CFP (see Ullmann 1985). Market-based CFP measures are less likely to be affected by 
differences in accounting procedures and managerial manipulation. Our study, therefore, uses two 
accounting-based measures (return on assets—ROA and return on equity—ROE). We also use a 
market-based measure (share price performance—SPP) to ensure that CSP is not sensitive to a 
particular performance measure. ROA is operating income over total assets; ROE is net income over 
common equity; and SPP is the annual change in adjusted share prices. 
 
3.3 Control variables 
We use several variables mainly drawn from prior literature, which have been shown to have effects 
on CFP as well as CSP. First, as in Pava and Krausz (1996) and Waddock and Graves (1997), we 
control for both firm size and risk effects. A company size does have a significant effect on both CSP 
and CFP. For instance, a firm’s CSR activities depend on its size, diversification level, consumer 
income, labour market conditions, stage in the industry life cycle, country of origin, and country of 
operation (see Adegbite and Nakajima 2011; McWilliams and Siegel 2001). We therefore use the 
natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE) to control for firm size.8 
 
Porter and Kramer (2002) argue that firms with a well-directed CSR strategy have a better chance of 
surviving hard times. This is because firms require strong relationships with employees, suppliers 
and customers, which can be effectively managed through stakeholder relationships. Therefore, as 
both leverage and firm risk can induce ‘hard times’, they should be related to CSP. 
 
We use company beta figures based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) theory (BETA) to 
control for time-varying firm risk relative to market risk. These figures capture market risk and depict 
the relationship between individual stock return volatility and market return volatility. We compute 
the annual beta for each firm using rolling time series regressions of excess company returns with 
respect to the FTSE All-Share Index returns using monthly data for the past 5 years. Low levels of CSR 
may result in greater exposure to financial risk as investors may believe that firms with less CSR are 
more risky due to the perception that the management of those firms possesses poor skills 
(Alexander and Buchholz 1978). Investors will demand high returns from firms that show less 
commitment to CSR as they believe lack of CSR may result in increased financial risk as a result of 
heavy fines and lawsuits. Also, low debt implies that firms can meet their obligations relatively 
easily. 
 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) argue that a generic model in the literature is inadequate as the 
direction of the relationship keeps changing when new variables, such as research and development 
(RD), investment and industry advertising intensity, are included. They note that past studies had 
generated spurious results due to model misspecification. Therefore, following Surroca et al. (2010), 
we include in our model RD, measured as the research and development expenses divided by total 
sales. If a company is highly leveraged, it would be under great pressure to meet its loan repayments 
from creditors and ensure satisfactory economic performance, which might lower CSR. We calculate 
leverage (LEVER) as total debt divided by total assets. We use current ratio (CUR) to capture a firm’s 
liquidity and short-term financial strength; we calculate CUR as current assets divided by current 
liabilities. We use GROWTH to control for current growth rate; we calculate GROWTH as the 
percentage change on the previous year’s sales. Following existing literature, we employ market-to-
book ratio (MBR) to capture future growth rate; we compute MBR as the ratio of ‘total assets plus 
market value of equity less book value of equity’ to total assets. Short et al. (2015) show that CSP is 
associated with industry characteristics. Therefore, to account for this, we employ nine industry 
dummies (INDUSTRY) based on the classification provided in Table 13.9 Furthermore, the literature 
related to the managerial viewpoint contends that the financial decisions of corporations are largely 
influenced by their managers’ preferences, desires and objectives. For instance, Barnea and Rubin 
(2010) argue that entrenched managerial ownership reduces incentives to allocate substantial 
financial resources to CSR expenditure. Following Sun et al. (2016), amongst others, we use 
managerial ownership (MANOW) to capture managerial entrenchment. 
 
4 Empirical analyses 
4.1 Model specifications 
We adopt the system-GMM model for our regression analysis. This is as a result of the dynamic 
nature of the model which accounts for other unobservable factors. Nelling and Webb (2009) found 
that CSP is determined more by firm-specific factors than by CFP. This necessitates the need to 
control for the effects of certain fixed factors, such as capital intensity and managerial reputation, 
among others. Furthermore, as it is difficult to maintain exogeneity in firm-level data, the direction 
of causation between variables could be problematic because of the endogeneity issue, i.e., the 
correlation between regressors and the error term. Therefore, using contemporaneous data for CFP 
or CSP and their determinants may generate spurious results. Thus, to account for these 
econometric problems, we use the system-GMM specification (see e.g., Duanmu and Guney 2013; 
Wintoki et al. 2012). Below, we illustrate our models without considering non-linearity and lagged 
analysis. 
LNCSPi,t=α+β1CFPi,t+ΣβsCONTROLSs,i,t+ΣβjINDUSTRYj+ΣβkTIMEk+μi+μt+εi,t 
(4) 
CFPi,t=τ+γ1LNCSPi,t+ΣγsCONTROLSs,i,t+ΣγjINDUSTRYj+ΣγkTIMEk+μi+μt+Ψi,t 
(5) 
where LNCSP is the logarithmic transformation of the social performance (CSP) measure; CFP is 
corporate financial performance based on ROA, ROE or SPP (without the log transformation as they 
are in decimal values); TIME (INDUSTRY) is for yearly (industry) dummy variables, respectively. The 
term µi represents unobservable time-invariant firm-specific effects, such as company reputation 
and µt represents time-variant effects common to all firms, such as an economic downturn; εi,t and 
Ψi,t are the time-varying disturbance terms that are serially uncorrelated with mean zero and 
standard deviation δ. The subscripts: i = 1 to 314 (firms); t = 2002 to 2015 (years) and hence k 
represents 13 yearly dummies; j =1 to 8 (industry dummies) and s = 1 to 8 as CONTROLS, represent 
these eight variables (i.e., SIZE, RD, BETA, CUR, LEVER, GROWTH, MBR and MANOW). Finally, α, τ, γ’s 
and β’s are estimable coefficients. To consider the non-linearity issue, we employ the following 
setting: 
LNCSPi,t=α+β1CFPi,t+β2CFP2i,t+β3CFP3i,t+ΣβsCONTROLSs,i,t+ΣβjINDUSTRYj+ΣβkTIMEk+μi+μt+εi,t 
(6) 
CFPi,t=τ+γ1LNCSPi,t+γ2LNCSP2i,t+γ3LNCSP3i,t+ΣγsCONTROLSs,i,t+ΣγjINDUSTRYj+ΣγkTIMEk+μi+μt+Ψi
,t 
(7) 
where CFP2 and CFP3 are the squared and cubed terms of CFP, respectively; and LNCSP2 and 
LNCSP3 are the squared and cubed terms of LNCSP, respectively. 
Furthermore, to consider the lag effects of CSP (CFP) on CFP (CSP), we include the corresponding 
lagged variables in Eqs. 4 and 5, respectively. In the next section, we employ a set of combinations in 
the models by including all the parabolic and cubic terms, and similarly some of the factors are 
lagged by one and two periods, which is to ensure comparative robustness as in Nelling and Webb 
(2009). Following the implications of Eq. (3), we further include lagged LNCSP in Eqs. (4) and (6). 
 
4.2 The system-GMM estimations 
Under the two-step system-GMM setting, the model is estimated at both levels and first differences; 
i.e., in the stacked regressions level, equations are simultaneously estimated using differenced 
lagged regressors as instruments. Regarding the consideration of a virtuous circle for example, it is 
expected that CFPt−2 enhances CSPt−1, which in turn increases CFP t . The system-GMM method 
accounts for such potential endogeneity issues by using appropriate instrument sets.10 This 
estimation technique, hence, controls for this econometric issue that may arise from random shocks 
affecting both CFP and CSP, and their determinants simultaneously. As explained in Arellano and 
Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998), among others, pooled OLS, fixed effects, instrumental 
variables and even traditional difference-GMM methods would produce biased results for dynamic 
models. 
 
4.3 Univariate analysis 
In Table 1, we divide the sample into four quartiles by sorting firms according to their CSP, which is 
based on the minimum value of 4.49% and maximum value of 98.83%. The results (statistically 
different mean and median values) show that the characteristics of firms with high CSP (quartile 4), 
in general, differ significantly from low CSP firms (quartile 1). As CSP increases on average from 
quartile 1 to quartile 4, SPP reduces. However, the other financial performance figures (i.e., ROA and 
ROE) seem to suggest the absence of a linear relationship between CSP and CFP. 
[TABLE 1] 
Sample size is 3240 observations for 314 firms. CSP is the corporate social performance measure; 
BETA is the CAPM’s historical beta coefficient over the period of 5 years; SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of deflated total assets; ROA is operating income divided by total assets; ROE is net income divided 
by common equity; SPP is share price performance measured as the natural logarithmic difference 
between share prices at time t and t − 1; RD is research and development expenses divided by total 
sales (missing R&D data were replaced by zeroes); CUR is current assets divided by current liabilities; 
LEVER is total debt divided by total assets; GROWTH is percentage change in annual sales. MBR is 
the ratio of ‘total assets plus market value of equity less book value of equity’ to total assets. 
MANOW is the percentage of the number of shares held by insiders as executives and top-line 
managers in total shares outstanding. See Table 14 for further details of the variables’ definitions. 
The sample is divided into four equal quartiles; from firms with lowest CSP (quartile 1) to highest CSP 
(quartile 4) values; T-statistic (Z-statistic; Wilcoxon signed ranks test) is for the mean (median) 
differences of each variable between the fourth and first quartiles. Median values are in the 
parentheses 
* (**) (***)Indicate the difference is significant at the 10% (5%) (1%) level (two-tailed). The figures in
the square brackets show the CSP range in each quartile 
[TABLE 2] 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for our variables, including year-on-year change effects in 
CSP and CFP. The firms show an average CSP score of 63.071 which suggests that the average firm 
has less CSP concern. ∆CSP t , ∆CSPt−1, and ∆CSPt−2 are 1.333, 1.315, and 1.310 respectively. 
Similarly, the average market-based SPP is 0.048, whilst ∆SPP t , ∆SPPt−1, and ∆SPPt−2 are − 0.013, − 
0.001, and 0.017 respectively. The year-on-year change effects for the accounting-based 
performance measures are ∆ROA t , (− 0.001), ∆ROAt−1, (0.000), and ∆ROAt−2 (0.000), ∆ROE t , (− 
0.001), ∆ROEt−1, (0.005), and ∆ROEt−2 (0.003). CSP exhibits considerable volatility with a standard 
deviation of 25.836. CFP is fairly stable given a standard deviation of 0.129, 0.566, and 0.437 for 
ROA, ROE, and SPP respectively. 
Sample size is 3240 observations for 314 firms. CSP is the corporate social performance measure; 
BETA is the CAPM’s historical beta coefficient over the period of 5 years; SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of deflated total assets; ROA is operating income divided by total assets; ROE is net income divided 
by common equity; SPP is share price performance measured as the natural logarithmic difference 
between share prices at time t and t − 1; RD is research and development expenses divided by total 
sales (missing R&D data were replaced by zeroes); CUR is current assets divided by current liabilities; 
LEVER is total debt divided by total assets; GROWTH is percentage change in annual sales; MBR is 
the ratio of total assets plus market value of equity less book value of equity’ to total assets; 
MANOW is the percentage of the number of shares held by insiders as executives and top-line 
managers in total shares outstanding. See Table 14 for further details of the variables’ definitions. 
The notations ∆Xt, ∆Xt−1 and ∆Xt−2 for the variable X related to CSP or CFP are the first-differenced 
transformations, i.e., Xt–Xt−1. Xt−1–Xt−2 and Xt−2–Xt−3, respectively 
4.4 Bivariate correlation analysis 
[TABLE 3] 
Correlation analysis is reported in Table 3. Not surprisingly, the CFP measures are positively and 
significantly correlated with each other. The highest correlation amongst CFP measures is observed 
between ROA and ROE. CSP is highly and positively correlated with SIZE and leverage ratio. On the 
other hand, CUR, MBR and GROWTH are inversely and significantly correlated with CSP. 
Furthermore, BETA, ROA, ROE, SPP and RD do not significantly correlate with CSP. All CFP measures 
are strongly and negatively correlated with SIZE. The (unreported) variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
are far below the threshold value of 10 (minimum  = 1.02; maximum = 2.72), which implies the 
absence of multicollinearity problems among the explanatory variables. MANOW is negatively and 
significantly correlated with LNCSP, suggesting that entrenched managerial ownership reduces the 
incentive of firms to commit financial resources to enhance CSP. This is consistent with the negative 
correlation between MANOW and SPP. 
Sample size is 3240 observations for 314 firms. LNCSP is the logarithmic transformation of CSP 
where CSP is our corporate social performance measure; BETA is the CAPM’s historical beta 
coefficient over the period of 5 years; SIZE is the natural logarithm of deflated total assets; ROA is 
operating income divided by total assets; ROE is net income divided by common equity; SPP is share 
price performance measured as the natural logarithmic difference between share prices at time t 
and t − 1;RD is research and development expenses divided by total sales (missing R&D data were 
replaced by zeroes); CUR is current assets divided by current liabilities; LEVER is total debt divided by 
total assets; GROWTH is percentage change in annual sales; MBR is the market-to-book ratio 
computed as total assets plus market value of equity less book value of equity, all scaled by total 
assets and market value and book value dates are matched. MANOW is the percentage of the 
number of shares held by insiders as executives and top-line managers in total shares outstanding. 
See Table 14 for further details of the variables’ definitions. The asterisk * indicates if the correlation 
coefficient is significant at the 1% level (two-tailed, Pearson) 
 
4.5 Main regression results and discussion 
[TABLE 4] 
Table 4 provides the GMM results for the model analyzing CFP determinants.11 When assuming a 
linear relationship between CFP and CSP in model 1, the current CSP has a very significant and 
positive influence on ROA. In model 2, we include the lagged values of CSP at time t and t − 1; 
although these lagged effects are statistically insignificant, the current CSP continues to have a 
strong and positive link with the current CFP. In model 3, we consider the possibility of a non-linear 
association between CSP and CFP; the respective coefficients transpire to be significant, although 
the squared and cubed terms are significant at the 10% level. When CFP is proxied by ROA, our 
results do not follow closely hypothesis 1. In models 4 and 5, current CSP significantly affects current 
ROE. In model 6, we test for the presence of a non-linear correlation between CSP and ROE but the 
results are insignificant. These findings rather suggest a linear link between CSP and CFP, and hence 
are in favour of hypothesis 1 when CFP is measured by ROE. In model 5, our results lend some 
support to hypothesis 1 with respect to the positive coefficient on CSP lagged one period and are 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
The dependent variable is CFP, measured by ROA, ROE or SPP. LNCSP2 and LNCSP3 are the squared 
and cubed terms of LNCSP as corporate social performance measures, respectively; LNCSP(−1) and 
LNCSP(−2) are the lagged LNCSP for one and two periods, respectively. ROA is operating income 
divided by total assets; ROE is net income divided by common equity; SPP is the natural logarithmic 
difference between share prices at time t and t − 1. BETA is the CAPM’s historical beta coefficient 
over the period of 5 years; SIZE is the natural logarithm of deflated total assets; ROA is operating 
income divided by total assets; ROE is net income divided by common equity; SPP is share price 
performance measured as the natural logarithmic difference between share prices at time t and t − 
1;RD is research and development expenses divided by total sales (missing R&D data were replaced 
by zeroes); CUR is current assets divided by current liabilities; LEVER is total debt divided by total 
assets; GROWTH is percentage change in annual sales; MBR is the market-to-book ratio computed as 
total assets plus market value of equity less book value of equity, all scaled by total assets and 
market value and book value dates are matched. MANOW is the percentage of the number of shares 
held by insiders as executives and top-line managers in total shares outstanding. See Table 14 for 
further details of the variables’ definitions. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and finite 
sample bias are in parentheses below the coefficients. The Wald statistics test the joint significance 
of estimated coefficients, asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of no relationship. AR(1) 
and AR(2) are the first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively, which are 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen is the test of 
overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null hypothesis, which 
states that the instruments employed are valid with the absence of the overidentification problem. 
Difference-in-Hansen is the test of exogeneity of instrument subsets under the null hypothesis which 
states that the differenced-instruments used in level equations are exogenous. Time and industry 
dummies are used for all estimates. Only consistently significant industry dummies are reported in 
models 1–3 (industry groups 4 and 6), in models 4–6 (industry groups 2 and 6), and in models 7–9 
(industry groups 2, 6 and 10); see Table 13 
(*), (**) and (***)Indicate that coefficients are significant or the relevant null hypothesis is rejected 
at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Stata 14 does not report R2 for the system-GMM analyses. 
Sample size is 3240 observations for 314 firms 
On the other hand, when a non-linear relationship between CFP and CSP is assumed in model 9, we 
obtain a cubic link between CSP and SPP as the coefficient estimates are all statistically significant at 
the 1 and 5% levels. This means that CFP improves with low and high levels of CSR activities but 
declines at the medium CSP levels.12 This result may suggest an optimal CSR intensity. Also, the CSP 
coefficients in models 7 and 8 are insignificant. This means that hypothesis 1 is not supported when 
CFP is measured by SPP. 
Regarding other factors, the significant and negative coefficients in models 1–3 for SIZE suggest that 
smaller firms have higher profitability ratios. Firm beta (BETA) negatively affects ROE but does not 
influence ROA or SPP. Higher firm liquidity (CUR) has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
SPP only in model 8. Debt ratio is positively (negatively) associated with ROE (SPP). Surprisingly, 
higher RD activities reduce ROA and ROE. Future growth options (MBR) positively impact on CFP, 
whereas current growth rate’s effect on CFP depends on how we measure CFP. Finally, managerial 
ownership (MANOW) exerts a statistically significantly positive influence on ROE and ROA although 
this effect is insignificant on SPP.13 
[TABLE 5] 
Table 5 examines the determinants of current CSP levels. Following the implications of Eq. (3) as a 
dynamic model, including the lagged dependent variable [CSP−1] in the model as one of the 
explanatory variables may capture the presence of such an optimality. The results show that the 
coefficient on CSP−1 is always between 0 and 1, and is statistically significant at the 1% level. These 
findings imply that companies find it rational to dynamically adjust the level of their CSR activities 
because of the varying costs and benefits that are associated with the process. This thereby supports 
hypothesis 3. Given that the speed of adjustment [α = 1 minus coefficient estimate on CSP−1] ranges 
between 0.326 and 0.410, one can say that once the company hugely deviates from the optimal CSR 
activities, the adjustment process is not slow as α is far away from zero. Therefore, the adjustment 
costs that need to be allocated for the purpose of the deviation from the optimal CSR levels are not 
too deterring. 
The dependent variable is LNCSP as a corporate social performance measure. LNCSP(−1) is the 
lagged LNCSP for one period. CFP is either ROA (models 1–3), ROE (models 4–6) or SPP (models 7–9). 
CFP(−1) and CFP(−2) are the lagged CFP for one and two periods, respectively; CFP2 and CFP3 are the 
squared and cubed terms of CFP, respectively. ROA is operating income divided by total assets; ROE 
is net income divided by common equity; SPP is share price performance measured as the natural 
logarithmic difference between share prices at time t and t − 1; BETA is the CAPM’s historical beta 
coefficient over the period of 5 years; SIZE is the natural logarithm of deflated total assets; ROA is 
operating income divided by total assets; ROE is net income divided by common equity; RD is 
research and development expenses divided by total sales (missing R&D data were replaced by 
zeroes); CUR is current assets divided by current liabilities; LEVER is total debt divided by total 
assets; GROWTH is percentage change in annual sales; MBR is the market-to-book ratio computed as 
total assets plus market value of equity less book value of equity, all scaled by total assets and 
market value and book value dates are matched. MANOW is the percentage of the number of shares 
held by insiders as executives and top-line managers in total shares outstanding. See Table 14 for 
further details of the variables’ definitions. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and finite 
sample bias are in parentheses below the coefficients. The Wald statistics test the joint significance 
of estimated coefficients, asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of no relationship. AR(1) 
and AR(2) are the first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen is the test of 
overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null hypothesis which 
states that the instruments employed are valid with the absence of the overidentification problem. 
Difference-in-Hansen is the test of exogeneity of instrument subsets under the null hypothesis, 
which states that the differenced-instruments used in level equations are exogenous. Time and 
industry dummies are used for all estimates. Only consistently significant industry dummies are 
reported in models 1–3 (industry groups 2, 6, 7 and 10), in models 4–6 (industry groups 2, 6 and 10), 
and in models 7–9 (industry groups 3 and 9); see Table 13 
(*), (**) and (***)Indicate that coefficients are significant or the relevant null hypothesis is rejected 
at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Stata 14 does not report R2 for the system-GMM analyses. 
Sample size is 3240 observations for 314 firms 
When we made the initial assumption that CFP affects CSP monotonously, there is strong evidence 
that higher CFP leads to higher CSP (models 1, 2, 4, 5 and 8). Being consistent with hypothesis 1, 
these results suggest that financial affordability plays a key role in a company undertaking CSR 
activities. As in Nelling and Webb (2009), our analysis in Table 5 can be considered to be testing the 
presence of Granger causality from CFP to CSP. The coefficients on lagged CFP in models (5) and (8) 
are significant at both at the 5 and 10% level, which supports the hypothesis that the presence of 
this is causality. Regarding the consideration of the virtuous circle between CSP and CFP, we find 
that CFP lagged two periods positively affects CSP lagged one period (model 5 of Table 5) and then 
this lagged CSP exerts a direct influence on current CFP (model 5 of Table 4).14 In other words, when 
CFP is measured by ROE, our study finds the presence of a virtuous circle for the UK firms. 
When we assume that CFP affects CSP non-monotonously in Table 5, the link between CSP and CFP 
based on ROA or ROE shows a cubic pattern in models 3 and 6. These findings suggest that CFP 
negatively affects CSP at low and high levels of CFP but for the medium CFP levels the effect is 
positive.15 Therefore, these results do not support hypothesis 1 when we proxy CFP by ROA and 
ROE. The results in Table 5 imply both a linear and non-linear relationship between CSP and CFP. 
This suggests that one needs to be cautious with regard to whether a linear or non-linear association 
is more appropriate when investigating the effect of financial performance on social performance. 
To address this issue, we employed Ramsey’s RESET specification test in which the null hypothesis 
suggests a linear association against the alternative hypothesis of non-linear association. The test 
suggests a strong rejection of the null hypothesis (p value = 0.00), which means that the non-linear 
form is more appropriate. 
It should be noted that the significant coefficient estimate on CFP (see models 3 and 6 of Table 5) 
does not necessarily mean that the relationship between financial performance and social 
performance is linear; this is because in models with quadratic equations, the variable with a 
polynomial degree of one (CFP) should be considered together with the parabolic (CFP2) and cubic 
(CFP3) terms. Table 5 shows that the causal link between CSP and CFP runs from one direction of 
CSP, as LNCSP(−1) is statistically significant at the 1% level from models 1–9. Table 5 reports the 
results of the control variables. SIZE has a positive and statistically significant effect on CSP. 
However, CSP reduces significantly when firm liquidity or leverage ratios increase. The remaining 
control variables generally do not exert any significant influence on CSP. 
We further examine the associations between CSP and CFP within UK firms for the period 2002–
2015. Our focus is to determine whether any linear link exists, and the causality of any such 
relationship by considering the endogeneity problem. We also analyze if any non-monotonous 
relationship exists between CSP and CFP, and if companies will have optimal or target CSR activity 
levels. We find certain degrees of non-linear links between CSP and CFP. In addition, current and 
past CFP values seem to impact linearly on the current CSP but the presence of a cubic association 
between these two variables is more apparent. Our results suggest that CFP and CSP are neither 
strictly positively nor negatively correlated but the association is rather non-linear. This confirms 
Brammer and Millington’s (2008) findings, and therefore suggests that the disagreement on the 
CSP–CFP link debate is due to the fact that the literature has ignored the non-linearity and target 
CSR issues (see also Barnett and Salomon 2006). Our study differs from that of Barnett and Salomon 
(2006) in several ways: we extend their parabolic setting, by considering a cubic link between CSP 
and CFP. They focused on socially responsible investing in the U.S., whereas our CSP measure for the 
UK firms is more comprehensive, and we also include several explanatory variables. We further 
conduct a dynamic analysis and use a robust system-GMM estimation method that is efficient for 
panel data analyses. 
Our analysis reveals that concurrent CFP (ROA, ROE or SPP) linearly and significantly affects 
concurrent CSP in the sense that higher financial performance suggests higher social performance. 
The results suggest that financially stable companies can afford to be socially responsible. Similarly, 
concurrent CSP linearly, significantly and positively affects CFP proxy by ROA and ROE, and past CSP 
positively affects current ROE, although they are statistically significant at the 10% level. Moreover, 
CFP lagged one and two periods (SPP and ROE definitions) have a positive and statistically significant 
influence on current CSP. On the other hand, we report a cubic link between CSP and CFP (based on 
SPP) which suggests that at low and high levels of CSR activities, CFP improves but CFP reduces at 
the medium levels. Hence, the issue of whether firms should differentiate themselves with high 
commitment to CSR to impress stakeholders or save the resources seems to matter. Furthermore, 
when we examine the effect of ROA and ROE on CSP, we find another cubic association, which 
implies that firms with low and high financial performance negatively affect CSP but medium 
financial performance is associated with an improved CSP. 
On the virtuous circle of the CSP-CFP relationship, a more integrated relationship receives support 
from our empirical analysis. Thus, it seems firms can be socially responsible and financially successful 
at the same time, and companies can have a competitive advantage if they invest in CSR activities 
(see also Gregory et al. 2016). Our findings further lend some support to the presence of the 
virtuous circle, which suggests that past CFP improves present CSP which then improves future CFP. 
Our partial adjustment process reveals that firms are prone to having target CSR structures and they 
periodically revise the intensity of their CSR activities in order to be at their optimal CSP levels. This 
is consistent with our hypothesis 3. Furthermore, the diagnostic tests for the system-GMM estimates 
highlight the relevance of the endogeneity problem when running regressions. It is also important to 
note that the regression results are not independent from econometric specifications and the 
proxies of CFP. 
4.6 Additional tests 
In this section, we perform additional analyses to provide robustness to our primary findings. First, 
we analyse year-on-year changes in CFP and CSP to underline our main results. Second, we perform 
our analysis based on financial and non-financial firms. Third, we consider our analysis based on the 
intensity of CSR engagement across industries. Finally, we assess the relevance of the global financial 
crisis by running the models across two time periods. 
4.6.1 Year-on-year change effects 
In our main analyses, we considered the association between CSP and CFP in levels. In this sub-
section, we focus on the effects of year-on-year changes. Table 6 reports the regression results when 
CSP is first-differenced at time t, t − 1 and t − 2 (i.e., ∆CSP t , ∆CSPt−1, and ∆CSPt−2, respectively) as a 
set of explanatory variables and CFP is first-differenced at time t (i.e., ∆CFP t ) as the dependent 
variable. When Tables 4 and 6 are compared, it seems that CSP and CFP have more significant links 
when they are measured in levels compared to when they are in first-differences. However, our 
analysis obtained a few significant links regarding the year-on-year changes: in model 3, lagged CSP 
at time t − 2 impacts positively on first-differenced ROA at time t. On the other hand, in models 9–12 
when we proxy CFP by market base variable SPP, we find that a reduction in CSP negatively affects 
SPP. This is consistent with Cheung (2016) who argues that CSP has a negative effect on idiosyncratic 
risk. An increase in idiosyncratic risk perceived by investors as a result of reduction in financial 
resources committed by firms to CSP will negatively affect the firm’s share price. 
[TABLE 6] 
The dependent variable is the annual change in CFP, measured by the first-differenced (i.e., ∆) 
transformations of ROA, ROE or SPP. ∆LNCSP, ∆LNCSP(−1) and ∆LNCSP(−2) are the first-differenced 
values of LNCSP as corporate social performance measures at time t, t − 1 and t − 2, respectively. 
ROA is operating income divided by total assets; ROE is net income divided by common equity; SPP is 
share price performance measured as the natural logarithmic difference between share prices at 
time t and t − 1; BETA is the CAPM’s historical beta coefficient over the period of 5 years; SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of deflated total assets; ROA is operating income divided by total assets; ROE is net 
income divided by common equity; RD is research and development expenses divided by total sales 
(missing R&D data were replaced by zeroes); CUR is current assets divided by current liabilities; 
LEVER is total debt divided by total assets; GROWTH is percentage change in annual sales; MBR is 
the market-to-book ratio computed as total assets plus market value of equity less book value of 
equity, all scaled by total assets and market value and book value dates are matched. MANOW is the 
percentage of the number of shares held by insiders as executives and top-line managers in total 
shares outstanding. See Table 14 for further details of the variables’ definitions. Standard errors 
robust to heteroscedasticity and finite sample bias are in parentheses below the coefficients. The 
Wald statistics test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, asymptotically distributed as 
χ2(df) under the null of no relationship. AR(1) and AR(2) are the first and second order 
autocorrelation of residuals, respectively, which are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. Hansen is the test of overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2(df) under the null hypothesis, which states that the instruments employed are valid 
with the absence of the overidentification problem. Difference-in-Hansen is the test of exogeneity of 
instrument subsets under the null hypothesis which states that the differenced-instruments used in 
level equations are exogenous. Time and industry dummies are used for all estimates. Only 
consistently significant industry dummies are reported in models 1–4 (industry groups 4 and 9), in 
models 5–8 (industry groups 7 and 9), and in models 9–12 (industry groups 2 and 7); see Table 13 
(*), (**) and (***)Indicate that coefficients are significant or the relevant null hypothesis is rejected 
at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Stata 14 does not report R2 for the system-GMM analyses. 
Sample size is 3240 observations for 314 firms 
[TABLE 7] 
Table 7 reports the regression results when CFP is first-differenced at time t, t−1 and t−2 (i.e., ∆CFP t 
, ∆CFPt−1, and ∆CFPt−2, respectively) as a set of explanatory variables and CSP is first-differenced at 
time t (i.e., ∆CSP t ) as the dependent variable. When we compare the findings of Table 7 with Table 
5, the lagged first differenced CSP is significant in all models with coefficients taking values between 
values 0 and 1 in absolute terms; the corresponding signs are negative because the analyses are 
done by taking into account year-on-year changes. Overall, these findings suggest the presence of 
optimal CSR activities. As for the CSP–CFP nexus, the hypothesized positive link is apparent in model 
4 where all dimensions of transformed ROA are statistically significant. Concerning ROE, its effect on 
∆CSP is positive and statistically significant only for the first-differenced values at t−2. Furthermore, 
with regard to SPP, the expected positive is reported only when SPP has its first-differenced 
transformation at t−1. 
The dependent variable is the annual change in CSP, measured by the first-differenced (i.e., ∆) 
transformation of LNCSP as a corporate social performance measure. ∆LNCSP(−1) is the first-
differenced values of ∆LNCSP at time t − 1. ∆LNCFP, ∆LNCFP(−1) and ∆LNCFP(−2) are the first-
differenced values of CFP at time t, t − 1 and t − 2, respectively; ROA is operating income divided by 
total assets; ROE is net income divided by common equity; SPP is share price performance measured 
as the natural logarithmic difference between share prices at time t and t − 1; BETA is the CAPM’s 
historical beta coefficient over the period of 5 years; SIZE is the natural logarithm of deflated total 
assets; RD is research and development expenses divided by total sales (missing R&D data were 
replaced by zeroes); CUR is current assets divided by current liabilities; LEVER is total debt divided by 
total assets; GROWTH is percentage change in annual sales; MBR is the market-to-book ratio 
computed as total assets plus market value of equity for less book value of equity, all scaled by total 
assets and market value and book value dates are matched. MANOW is the percentage of the 
number of shares held by insiders as executives and top-line managers in total shares outstanding. 
See Table 14 for further details of the variables’ definitions. Standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity and finite sample bias are in parentheses below the coefficients. The Wald 
statistics test the joint significance of estimated coefficients, asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) 
under the null of no relationship. AR(1) and AR(2) are the first and second order autocorrelation of 
residuals, respectively, which are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. Hansen is the test of overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) 
under the null hypothesis which states that the instruments employed are valid with the absence of 
the overidentification problem. Difference-in-Hansen is the test of exogeneity of instrument subsets 
under the null hypothesis, which states that the differenced-instruments used in level equations are 
exogenous. Time and industry dummies are used for all estimates. Only consistently significant 
industry dummies are reported in models 1–4 (industry groups 4 and 8), in models 5–8 (industry 
groups 2 and 7), and in models 9–12 (industry groups 2, 7 and 8); see Table 13 
(*), (**) and (***)Indicate that coefficients are significant or the relevant null hypothesis is rejected 
at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Stata 14 does not report R2 for the system-GMM analyses. 
Sample size is 3240 observations for 314 firms 
 
4.6.2 Financial versus non-financial firms 
[TABLE 8] 
The importance or implications of being a socially responsible company may change depending on 
the business sector or industry group the company is operating in (see e.g., Jenkins 2004; Scholtens 
2008b; Waddock and Graves 1997). In Table 8, we investigate the CSP and CFP determinants by 
splitting our sample into financial (industry groups 8 and 9) and non-financial firms (industry groups 
1–7 and 10) based on the industry classification in Table 13 in the Appendix.16 Panel A of Table 8 
reports the results when we regress CFP on CSP: the only significant result in panel A is the positive 
link between CSP and ROA in model 1. In Panel B, we conduct the same regressions for non-financial 
firms; the only significant and positive link between CSP and CFP is observed when CFP is measured 
by ROE in model 4. Panel B further reveals that CSP and CFP have a cubic relationship but the nature 
of this relationship depends on the CFP proxy; in model 3, higher or lower CFP improves ROA but at 
the medium CSP level, ROA decreases. In model 9, on the other hand, higher or lower CFP reduces 
ROA but at the medium level CSP improves ROA. 
The dependent variable is CFP in panels A and B, measured by ROA, ROE or SPP. The dependent 
variable is LNCSP as a corporate social performance measure in panels C and D. CFP is either ROA 
(models 1–3), ROE (models 4–6) or SPP (models 7–9). CFP(−1) and CFP(−2) are the lagged CFP for 
one and two periods, respectively; LNCSP(−1) and LNCSP(−2) are the lagged LNCSP for one and two 
periods, respectively; LNCSP2 and LNCSP3 are squared and cubed terms of LNCSP, respectively; CFP2 
and CFP3 are squared and cubed terms of CFP, respectively. ROA is operating income divided by 
total assets; ROE is net income divided by common equity; SPP is share price performance measured 
as the natural logarithmic difference between share prices at time t and t − 1. See Table 14 for 
further details of the variables’ definitions. Time dummies are included in all models. We include the 
other explanatory variables (i.e., SIZE, RD, BETA, CUR, LEVER, GROWTH, MBR and MANOW) as 
defined in the notes to Table 1 and a constant term in all models but they are not reported for space 
concerns 
(*), (**) and (***) indicate that coefficients are significant or the relevant null hypothesis is rejected 
at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The Wald statistics (not reported) are consistently significant 
at the 1% level in all models. The unreported diagnostics statistics [i.e., AR(1), AR(2), Hansen, 
Difference-in-Hansen] confirm the validity and consistency of the system-GMM results. All 
unreported figures are available on request. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and finite 
sample bias are in parentheses below the coefficients. Financial firms are in industry groups 8 and 9; 
non-financial firms are in industry groups 1–7, and 10; see Table 13. Sample size is 703 (2537) 
observations for financial (non-financial) firms 
In Panels C and D of Table 8, we regress CSP on CFP for financial and non-financial firms, 
respectively. Although both business sectors seem to adopt optimal CSR levels, the speed of 
adjustment to the optimal CSP level is higher for non-financial firms. Moreover, the positive effects 
of CFP on CSP are more apparent for non-financial firms. With regard to financial firms, current CFP 
does not impact on current CSP. This relationship is consistent and statistically significant for non-
financial firms. Although it is not very persistent, there is some evidence to suggest that financial 
firms’ past ROA or past SPP have a positive and statistically significant effect on current CSP. An 
interesting finding in Panel D shows that CFP and CSP have a cubic link: CSP and ROA are negatively 
(positively) linked for lower and higher (medium) values of ROA. 
 
4.6.3 Intensity of CSR engagement across industries 
[TABLE 9] 
In this section, we divide our sample industries into three broad groupings based on the intensity 
with which the industry that firms belong to engages in CSR; (1) based on industries where CSR 
engagement is at high-levels; (2) industries where CSR participation is at medium-levels; and (3) 
industries where CSR is below the average level or is low. Using the mean CSP score for each 
industry in Table 13, we classify groups 7, 8 and 9 as those industries with low CSR engagement; 
groups 1, 5, 6 and 10 are industries with medium CSR engagement, and industries with high CSR 
engagement are groups 2, 3 and 4. Table 9 reports the regression results for these classifications. 
Panel A shows that firms in industries with low CSR engagement find it beneficial to increase their 
current CSP in order to improve their current CFP, whereas Panel C suggests that such an advantage 
is virtually non-existent. These findings imply that increasing the existing high level of CSR activities 
does not correspond to an increase in profitability; however, significantly low or high CSP can 
influence firms to optimize their CSR activities. Panels A, B and C show an interesting pattern to 
suggest a cubic relationship between CSP and SPP. For firms operating in medium-to-high CSR 
intensity industries (Panels B and C), the effect of CSP on SPP is negative for the low and high levels 
of CSP but this effect is positive for medium CSP levels. However, for firms operating in low-CSR 
intensity industries (Panel A), the impact of CSP on SPP is positive for the low and high levels of CSP 
but negative for medium CSP levels. This is consistent with Lins et al. (2017) who show that high CSP 
intensity firms experience higher profitability than low CSP firms as a result of high social capital and 
trust from investors, and Cheung (2016) who argues that high-CSR intensity firms experience lower 
idiosyncratic and systematic risk with stakeholders and investors respectively. 
The dependent variable is CFP in panels A, B and C, measured by ROA, ROE or SPP. The dependent 
variable is LNCSP as a corporate social performance measure in panels D, E and F. CFP is either ROA 
(models 1–3), ROE (models 4–6) or SPP (models 7–9). CFP(−1) and CFP(−2) are the lagged CFP for 
one and two periods, respectively; LNCSP(−1) and LNCSP(−2) are the lagged LNCSP for one and two 
periods, respectively; LNCSP2 and LNCSP3 are squared and cubed terms of LNCSP, respectively; CFP2 
and CFP3 are squared and cubed terms of CFP, respectively. ROA is operating income divided by 
total assets; ROE is net income divided by common equity; SPP is share price performance measured 
as the natural logarithmic difference between share prices at time t and t − 1;. See Table 14 for 
further details of the variables’ definitions. Time dummies are included in all models. We include the 
other explanatory variables (SIZE, RD, BETA, CUR, LEVER, GROWTH, MBR and MANOW) and a 
constant term in all models but they are not reported for space concerns 
(*), (**) and (***)Indicate that coefficients are significant or the relevant null hypothesis is rejected 
at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The Wald statistics (not reported) are consistently significant 
at the 1% level in all models. The unreported diagnostics statistics [i.e., AR(1), AR(2), Hansen, 
Difference-in-Hansen] confirm the validity and consistency of the system-GMM results. All 
unreported figures are available on request. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and finite 
sample bias are in parentheses below the coefficients. Industries with low CSR engagement are 
groups 7, 8 and 9 (1033 observations); industries with medium CSR engagement are groups 1, 5, 6 
and 10 (1481 observations); industries with high CSR engagement are groups 2, 3 and 4 (726 
observations). See Table 13 for the detailed industry classification 
Panels D, E and F of Table 9 show the effects of CFP on CSP based on the level of CSR engagement. 
With respect to the coefficient estimates on lagged CSP, the results indicate that all sub-groups 
adopt optimal CSR policies and the speed of adjustment to the desired CSP level is highest (lowest) 
in Panel F (Panel D). This suggests that it is easier for firms in high-CSR intensity industries to be on 
their target CSP levels relative to their peers operating in low-CSR intensity industries. Panel D 
reveals that current ROA and ROE positively affect current CSP levels. Although we observe similar 
correlations in Panels E and F, the mentioned association is less convincing. Therefore, one can 
assert that firms operating in low-CSR intensity industries experience the positive effect of current 
CFP on current CSP. 
In Panels D, E and F of Table 9 we observe a cubic association between CSP and CFP in three models. 
Model 3 of Panel D suggests that for firms in low-CSR intensity industries, CSP increases with low or 
high ROA figures but it decreases with medium ROA figures. However, model 9 of Panel D shows 
that firms in low-CSR intensity industries experience a decrease in CSP with low or high SPP figures 
but it increases with medium SPP figures. Finally, model 9 of Panel F shows that CSP decreases with 
low or high SPP figures but it increases with medium SPP figures in firms operating within high-CSR 
intensity industries. 
 
4.6.4 The relevance of the 2007–2008 global financial crises 
[TABLE 10] 
Some studies attribute the occurrence of 2007–2008 global financial crisis partly to poor CSR 
commitment as a result of corporate greed and unethical behaviour (see Argandoña 2009). For 
instance, Karaibrahimoglu (2010) argues that during the global financial crisis, CSP was low as firms 
engaged in cost cutting activities. However, other recent studies show that CSP has improved 
following the global financial crisis (see Kemper and Martin 2010). Lopatta and Kaspereit (2014) note 
that there is a perceived increase in CSP around the world post the global financial crisis. Similarly, 
Lins et al. (2017) state (and then empirically show) that as the public trust in firms following the 
financial crisis went down, the value of being socially responsible is bound to be rising during post-
crisis times. We therefore split our sample into two periods [i.e., pre-crisis (2002–2008), and post-
crisis (2009–2015)] to provide additional robustness to main results.17 
 Table 10 reports the CSP and CFP results after splitting the sample. An interesting finding emerges in 
Panels A and B. We observe that when CFP is based on ROE, the impact of CSP on CFP is negative 
during the pre-crisis period whereas the same association is positive during the post-crisis period. 
This finding is in line with the main findings of Lins et al. (2017). Furthermore, the non-linear link 
obtained in Table 4 (model 3) for the whole sample is reported again for the post-crisis period only 
in Table 10 (Panel B, model 3). Splitting the sample leads to the presence of another significant non-
linear association that we did not observe in the previous analyses: the effect of CSP on ROE is 
negative when CSR activities are low or high but at medium level the relationship is positive. Overall, 
we fail to report any linearly positive effect of CSP on CFP for the pre-crisis period. 
The dependent variable is CFP in panels A and B, measured by ROA, ROE or SPP. The dependent 
variable is LNCSP as a corporate social performance measure in panels C and D. CFP is either ROA 
(models 1–3), ROE (models 4–6) or SPP (models 7–9). CFP(−1) and CFP(−2) are the lagged CFP for 
one and two periods, respectively; LNCSP(−1) and LNCSP(−2) are the lagged LNCSP for one and two 
periods, respectively; LNCSP2 and LNCSP3 are squared and cubed terms of LNCSP, respectively; CFP2 
and CFP3 are squared and cubed terms of CFP, respectively. ROA is operating income divided by 
total assets; ROE is net income divided by common equity; SPP is share price performance measured 
as the natural logarithmic difference between share prices at time t and t − 1. See Table 13 for 
further details of the variables’ definitions. Time and industry dummies are included in all models. 
We include the other explanatory variables (i.e., SIZE, RD, BETA, CUR, LEVER, GROWTH, MBR and 
MANOW) as defined in the notes to Table 1 and a constant term in all models but they are not 
reported for space concerns 
(*), (**) and (***)Indicate that coefficients are significant or the relevant null hypothesis is rejected 
at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The Wald statistics (not reported) are consistently significant 
at the 1% level in all models. The unreported diagnostics statistics [i.e., AR(1), AR(2), Hansen, 
Difference-in-Hansen] confirm the validity and consistency of the system-GMM results. All 
unreported figures are available on request. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and finite 
sample bias are in parentheses below the coefficients. The pre-(post-)crisis period is between 2002 
and 2008 (2009–2015). Sample size is 1338 (1902) observations for the pre-(post-)crisis period 
Panels C and D show that in both periods, the UK firms continue to maintain optimal CSP and the 
speed of adjustment to this optimality is higher during the pre-crisis period. When both periods are 
compared, the linearly positive effect of CFP on CSP is clearly more apparent for the post-crisis 
period as this connection is virtually non-existent for the pre-crisis times. The only non-linear link is 
reported in Panel D (model 6) for the post-crisis years: the effect of ROE on CSP is negative (positive) 
if the intensity of CSR activities is low or high (medium). 
[TABLE 11] 
In Table 11 we consider again the pre-crisis and post-crisis years but only for financial firms. 
Regarding the effect of CSP on CFP, the results do not change across both time periods for these 
firms. With the exception of the positive effect of CSP on ROA in model 1, the results appear to be 
generally statistically insignificant. Yet, they are comparable to the related analyses reported in 
Table 8. Moreover, in Panels C and D, it is observed that financial firms adjust the level of their CSR 
activities towards target CSP levels faster in the post-crisis years than in pre-crisis years. Similarly, 
the positive effects of financial strength on CSP are more pronounced for the post-crisis period. 
The dependent variable is CFP in panels A and B, measured by ROA, ROE or SPP. The dependent 
variable is LNCSP as a corporate social performance measure in panels C and D. CFP is either ROA 
(models 1–3), ROE (models 4–6) or SPP (models 7–9). CFP(−1) and CFP(−2) are the lagged CFP for 
one and two periods, respectively; LNCSP(−1) and LNCSP(−2) are the lagged LNCSP for one and two 
periods, respectively; LNCSP2 and LNCSP3 are squared and cubed terms of LNCSP, respectively; CFP2 
and CFP3 are squared and cubed terms of CFP, respectively. ROA is operating income divided by 
total assets; ROE is net income divided by common equity; SPP is share price performance measured 
as the natural logarithmic difference between share prices at time t and t − 1. See Table 14 for 
further details of the variables’ definitions. Time and industry dummies are included in all models. 
We include the other explanatory variables (i.e., SIZE, RD, BETA, CUR, LEVER, GROWTH, MBR and 
MANOW) as defined in the notes to Table 1 and a constant term in all models but they are not 
reported for space concerns 
(*), (**) and (***)Indicate that coefficients are significant or the relevant null hypothesis is rejected 
at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The Wald statistics (not reported) are consistently significant 
at the 1% level in all models. The unreported diagnostics statistics [i.e., AR(1), AR(2), Hansen, 
Difference-in-Hansen] confirm the validity and consistency of the system-GMM results. All 
unreported figures are available on request. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and finite 
sample bias are in parentheses below the coefficients. The pre-(post-)crisis period is between 2002 
and 2008 (2009–2015). Financial firms are in industry groups 8 and 9; see Table 13 
[TABLE 12] 
In Table 12, we repeat our analyses attached to the ones in Table 11 but only focused on non-
financial firms. For both periods, the only significant and positive effect of CSP on CFP is observed 
when CFP is proxied by ROE. Yet again, for both periods we report a cubic association (model 3), 
which confirms the corresponding findings in Table 8 (Panel B, model 3). However, when CFP is 
based on SPP, the same cubic association that we report in Table 8 (Panel B, model 9) is obtained 
only during the pre-crisis times for the non-financial firms in Table 12 (Panel A, model 9). 
The dependent variable is CFP in panels A and B, measured by ROA, ROE or SPP. The dependent 
variable is LNCSP as a corporate social performance measure in panels C and D. CFP is either ROA 
(models 1–3), ROE (models 4–6) or SPP (models 7–9). CFP(−1) and CFP(−2) are the lagged CFP for 
one and two periods, respectively; LNCSP(−1) and LNCSP(−2) are the lagged LNCSP for one and two 
periods, respectively; LNCSP2 and LNCSP3 are squared and cubed terms of LNCSP, respectively; CFP2 
and CFP3 are squared and cubed terms of CFP, respectively. ROA is operating income divided by 
total assets; ROE is net income divided by common equity; SPP is share price performance measured 
as the natural logarithmic difference between share prices at time t and t − 1. See Table 14 for 
further details of the variables’ definitions. Time and industry dummies are included in all models. 
We include the other explanatory variables (i.e., SIZE, RD, BETA, CUR, LEVER, GROWTH, MBR and 
MANOW) as defined in the notes to Table 1 and a constant term in all models but they are not 
reported for space concerns. 
(*), (**) and (***)Indicate that coefficients are significant or the relevant null hypothesis is rejected 
at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The Wald statistics (not reported) are consistently significant 
at the 1% level in all models. The unreported diagnostics statistics [i.e., AR(1), AR(2), Hansen, 
Difference-in-Hansen] confirm the validity and consistency of the system-GMM results. All 
unreported figures are available on request. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and finite 
sample bias are in parentheses below the coefficients. The pre-(post-)crisis period is between 2002 
and 2008 (2009–2015). Non-financial firms are in industry groups 1–7 and 10; see Table 13 
In Panels C and D of Table 12, the presence of the optimal CSP continues to hold for these non-
financial firms. Further, the speed of adjustment is higher for the pre-crisis years than for the post-
crisis years, which is in contrast with the case of financial firms in Table 11. Finally, reminiscent of 
the previous results in this sub-section, the positive effects of CFP on CSP is more salient for the 
post-crisis period for the non-financial firms. 
5 Conclusions 
This study has examined the existence of non-linear link between CSP and CFP and, more 
importantly, how this shapes the optimal level of commitment to CSR activities. The presence of 
non-linearity between CSP and CFP is an important addition to the extant literature on CSR. Indeed, 
our empirical analysis indicates that (1) medium levels of CSR activities reduce financial performance 
while low and high CSR levels increase financial performance, and (2) firms with low and high 
financial performance are less committed to CSR activities, while firms with medium financial 
performance engage more in CSR commitments. Evidence from the intensity of CSR engagement 
across industries shows a cubic link between CSP and SPP. We find a strong support for CSP not 
having a significant impact on CFP in financial firms; however, CSP does have a significant impact on 
CFP in non-financial firms. We also find a significant impact of CFP on CSP in both financial and non-
financial firms. Our paper provides additional evidence as to how CSR activities and CFP interact 
during financial crisis and tranquil times. We report that the positive effect of CSP on CFP is more 
apparent during the post-financial crisis years. Furthermore, it appears that optimal CSR activities 
and the existence of non-monotonous relationships are relevant for both periods and the speed of 
adjustment to desired CSP levels depends on the time periods and industrial background of the 
firms. 
These findings have implications for slack resources theory, which suggests that CSR activities should 
increase with higher firm financial resources. This may not always be so, as the findings of this study 
suggest. Indeed, explaining why there are such non-linear links through other theoretical 
perspectives, such as institutional theory and legitimacy theory considerations may highlight firms’ 
motivations in engaging in CSR activities. Despite the theoretical relevance of our findings, it further 
implies that stakeholders (including government, customers and the wider public) may need to 
curtail their expectations of higher CSP from higher resourced firms. This has significant implications 
for CSR advocacy and policy. Methodologically, our study utilizes a robust and well-established 
index, ESG scores, which takes into account the multidimensional aspects of CSR. This is an 
important addition to the CSP/CFP discourse. Furthermore, the estimation model and partial 
adjustment process which we adopted in the study are useful empirical contributions to the CSP–
CFP nexus. Our examination of the presence of non-linear (parabolic and cubic) relationships 
between CSP and CFP suggests that companies might adjust the intensity of their CSR activities 
because of internal and external developments. This includes practical implications with regard to 
the drivers of CSR, the level of commitment to CSR activities, and the determinants of CSR activities, 
which are not always based on economic rationales. 
While this study shows that CFP and CSP are linked both monotonously and non-linearly, it remains 
to be seen why this occurs, although the non-linearity effect is more apparent. Future research can 
address this limitation through more advanced methods that have more robust testing for the 
presence of a virtuous circle, Furthermore, it is likely that the benefits and costs associated with CSP 
activities vary over time and managers need to respond appropriately to these changes. Future 
research could consider including an advertising metric in the analysis, based on the amount a 
company spends advertising its CSR actions to its stakeholders. This study is also related to 
corporate reputation and branding (Neville et al. 2005). Moreover, it is important to further 
investigate the timing associated with the relationship between CSP and CFP (Brammer and 
Millington 2008) as the interactions between these would become clearer if we know how long it 
would take for the impact of CSR on CFP to be shown. Data analysis with longer panels in emerging 
markets would be another future research opportunity. Also, future studies could methodologically 
scrutinize and identify the specific situations whereby it is unbeneficial to be socially responsible. 
Future studies that can further provide detailed empirical and theoretical analyses of stakeholder 
decision making processes might improve our understanding of how CSP interacts with CFP. 
 
Footnotes 
1. 
A study by Deloitte showed that in 2007, 80 of the FTSE 100 firms now report on their CSR, up from 
56 in 2002. This highlights that firms are increasingly recognizing the need to include CSR practices in 
core business strategies. 
 
2. 
Nelling and Webb (2009) obtain a significant relationship between CSP and CFP when the traditional 
statistical methods are used but the link weakens significantly when they employ the fixed effects 
method. Similarly, coupled with emphasizing the importance of endogeneity concerns, Surroca et 
al.’s (2010) fixed effects estimates show that CSP and CFP are not directly related. This highlights the 
sensitivity of results to the methods and importance of choosing the precise method. Baron et al. 
(2011) use the difference-GMM method for the same context. As raised by Nelling and Webb (2009), 
therefore, additional analyses using more advanced estimation techniques are necessary, despite 
the extensive empirical research in this area. 
 
3. 
We thank the referee for suggesting this dimension to us. 
 
4. 
Jiraporn and Chintrakarn (2013) provide tests to find out if the effect of the CEO power on their CSR 
activities is non-linear. Their regression analysis clearly detects a parabolic (reverse-U) association 
and they explain the connection of this nature within the ‘agency theory’ perspective. 
 
5. 
This section is based on the partial adjustment mechanism (Blinder 1986), and error correction 
mechanism that discusses long-term relationship between two factors and short-term deviation 
from equilibrium (Engle and Granger 1987; Johansen 1988). As discussed in Blundell and Bond 
(1998), the long-term link between the dependent variable and its determinants may differ from the 
short-term effects. Brammer and Millington (2008) raise the issue of deviation from ‘normal’ CSP 
and examine this by using the residual figures of the regression model. 
 
6. 
Any missing data were obtained from the company annual reports. Also, the time period for the 
variables ‘share price performance’ and ‘sales growth rate’ is 2001–2015 due to their definitions. 
 
7. 
It should further be noted that our simple correlation analysis between CSP and corporate 
governance quality yielded a Pearson coefficient of 0.53. This suggests that higher CSR activities go 
hand in hand with higher corporate governance scores, and that the combination of CSP and 
corporate governance scores would have qualitatively similar effects on CFP when compared with 
our current results. 
 
8. 
According to Chen and Metcalf (1980), CSP and size may be positively linked as larger firms have 
greater visibility and can invest better in CSR. One reason for this could be that bigger firms are 
under more pressure from stakeholders, and they need to respond to these demands more 
attentively or larger firms will benefit from economies of scale, better management and access 
regarding external stakeholders and resources, and better promotional opportunities. Orlitzky et al. 
(2003) and Stanwick and Stanwick (1998) show that, when size is controlled for, there still exists a 
positive link between CFP and CSP. Orlitzky et al. (2003) show that Chen and Metcalf’s (1980) finding 
that size was the real cause of both CSP and CFP was as a result of sampling error as, when analyzed 
over many samples, neither a significantly positive correlation between CSP and size nor a 
significantly positive correlation between CFP and size is found to exist. 
 
9. 
For brevity, in our regression analysis, we report industry dummies with significant effects. 
 
10. 
See also Jo et al. (2015) who consider several advanced techniques, including this specification, 
when they examine the link between environmental responsibility and financial performance. In 
addition, Shahzad and Sharfman (2015) highlight the importance of the sample selection bias, which 
is another type of endogeneity problem, when they investigate the effects of CSP on CFP, and they 
find a positive impact. 
 11. 
Three diagnostics should be met for the system-GMM results to be reliable and consistent. Our 
regression results are robust to these three criteria: The Hansen test confirms the validity of the 
instrument sets; AR(1) test suggests the presence of first-order autocorrelation; and AR(2) test 
confirms the absence of second-order autocorrelation. We also tested for the potential endogeneity 
of the factors following the Difference-in-Hansen statistic, for which the null hypothesis states that 
the variable is exogenous. This test suggests that, except for the time and industry dummy variables, 
all other explanatory variables should be treated as endogenous; it also reveals that the differenced-
instruments used in level equations are exogenous. 
 
12. 
The two inflection points for this cubic association are 2.8286 (first derivative) and 3.7228 (second 
derivative) in logarithmic values. These calculations suggest that when the CSP score is between 0.00 
and 16.92%, or higher than 41.38%, the link between CSP and CFP is positive; when the CSP range is 
between 16.92 and 41.38%, CSP actually reduces CFP. We also tested for the presence of a parabolic 
relationship in this model but failed to detect one. 
 
13. 
Lagged CFP is not used as one of the explanatory variables in the models in Table 3 because firms are 
expected to maximise rather than optimize CFP. Moreover, when we investigate the dynamic aspect 
of the CSP and CFP link we do not include the non-linear terms, and vice versa, in order to see the 
clear impact of each aspect. 
 
14. 
Further note that the effect of CFPt−2 on CSPt−1 can be considered as that of CFPt−1 on CSP t . 
 
15. 
The two inflection points for the cubic link in model 3 are − 0.0709 (first derivative) and 1.3982 
(second derivative). These calculations suggest that when ROA is lower than − 7.1% or higher than 
139.8%, CSP decreases when CFP increases; and when ROA is between − 7.1 and 139.8%, an increase 
in CFP actually improves CSP. We also tested for the presence of a parabolic relationship in this 
model but failed to detect one. 
 
16. 
For brevity, we only report in Table 8 the results for the variables related to CSP and CFP, although 
the models include the other explanatory variables mentioned in Sect. 4.1. 
 
17. 
In our sample, the average CSP value is 61.73% for the pre-crisis period and 64.01% for the post-
crisis period, which is in line with the conjecture that CSR activities would be given more importance 
by both corporate managers and capital markets following crises. One can therefore assert that UK 
firms became more socially responsible after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September 
2008. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Minimum Maximum Mean SD
CSP 4.49 98.83 63.071 25.836
DCSPt - 47.96 79.64 1.333 12.251
DCSPt-1 - 47.96 79.64 1.315 12.677
DCSPt-2 - 47.96 79.64 1.310 13.194
BETA - 5.49 18.39 1.124 0.707
SIZE 16.851 28.504 21.569 1.801
ROA - 1.122 3.158 0.101 0.129
DROAt - 1.113 1.181 - 0.001 0.064
DROAt-1 - 1.113 1.181 0.000 0.066
DROAt-2 - 1.113 1.181 0.000 0.067
ROE - 3.958 10 0.228 0.566
DROEt - 9.73 7.832 - 0.001 0.567
DROEt-1 - 9.73 7.832 0.005 0.569
DROEt-2 - 9.73 7.832 0.003 0.576
SPP - 3.246 2.631 0.048 0.437
DSPPt - 2.746 5.689 - 0.013 0.624
DSPPt-1 - 2.746 5.689 - 0.001 0.641
DSPPt-2 - 2.746 5.689 0.017 0.663
RD - 0.006 0.7 0.013 0.047
CUR 0.000 21.612 1.555 1.175
LEVER 0.000 0.990 0.243 0.198
GROWTH - 11.019 5.484 0.062 0.339
MBR 0.282 84.497 1.880 2.502
MANOW 0.000 70.148 0.467 1.979
Sample size is 3240 observations for 314 firms. CSP is the corporate social performance measure; BETA is
the CAPM’s historical beta coefficient over the period of 5 years; SIZE is the natural logarithm of deflated
total assets; ROA is operating income divided by total assets; ROE is net income divided by common equity;
SPP is share price performance measured as the natural logarithmic difference between share prices at time t
and t - 1; RD is research and development expenses divided by total sales (missing R&D data were
replaced by zeroes); CUR is current assets divided by current liabilities; LEVER is total debt divided by total
assets; GROWTH is percentage change in annual sales; MBR is the ratio of total assets plus market value of
equity less book value of equity’ to total assets; MANOW is the percentage of the number of shares held by
insiders as executives and top-line managers in total shares outstanding. See Table 14 for further details of
the variables’ definitions. The notations DXt, DXt-1 and DXt-2 for the variable X related to CSP or CFP are
the first-differenced transformations, i.e., Xt–Xt-1. Xt-1–Xt-2 and Xt-2–Xt-3, respectively
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Appendix
 Table 13 Industry classification
Group Industry Datastream INDG classes
1 Mining and quarrying
(Mean CSP score = 62.11)
50 (Exploration and Production)
51 (Oil Equipment and Services)
97 (Integrated Oil and Gas)
119 (Gold Mining)
122 (General Mining)
2 Manufacturing
(Mean CSP score = 70.49)
33 (Specialty Chemicals)
37 (Electrical Equipment)
43 (Industrial Machinery)
56 (Iron and Steel)
57 (Electronic Equipment)
67 (Brewers)
68 (Distillers and Vintners)
70 (Containers and Package)
71 (Food Products)
78 (Metals)
79 (Tobacco)
82 (Paper)
95 (Pharmaceuticals)
114 (Soft Drinks)
130 (Semiconductors)
3 Electricity, gas, steam and air
conditioning supply
Water supply; sewerage, waste
management
(Mean CSP score = 80.08)
31 (Gas Distribution)
47 (Waste Disposal)
91 (Multi-utilities)
144 (Water)
169 (Con. Electricity)
Table 13 continued
Group Industry Datastream INDG classes
4 Construction
(Mean CSP score = 66.54)
30 (Building Materials)
36 (Home Construction)
39 (Heavy Construction)
5 Wholesale and retail trade; repair
of motor vehicles and motor cycles
(Mean CSP score = 63.99)
60 (Furnishings)
62 (Nondurable Household Products)
63 (Auto Parts)
66 (Apparel Retailers)
69 (Clothing and Accessory)
85 (Home Improvement)
87 (Broadline Retailers)
88 (Food; Retail, wholesale)
89 (Diamonds and Gemstones)
90 (Specialty Retailers)
6 Leisure, accommodation and
food service activities
(Mean CSP score = 64.48)
55 (Recreational Services)
72 (Restaurants and Bars)
80 (Hotels)
94 (Travel and Tourism)
100 (Gambling)
115 (Broadcast and Entertainment)
7 Transport and storage; Information and
communication
(Mean CSP score = 58.37)
40 (Delivery Services)
41 (Media Agencies)
58 (Software)
64 (Transport Services)
84 (Publishing)
99 (Marine Transportation)
126 (Telecom Equipment)
129 (Airlines)
142 (Fixed Line Telecom)
143 (Mobile Telecom)
150 (Computer Services)
8 Financial and insurance activities
(Mean CSP score = 61.44)
42 (Consumer Finance)
46 (Financial Administration)
102 (Banks)
104 (Asset Managers)
106 (Life Insurance)
107 (Property and Casualty Insurance)
108 (Insurance Brokers)
109 (Investment Trusts)
111 (Investment Services)
113 (Specialty Finance)
141 (Full Line Insurance)
Table 13 continued
Group Industry Datastream INDG classes
9 Real estate activities; Professional,
scientific and technical activities;
Administrative and support service
(Mean CSP score = 46.45)
112 (Real Estate Development)
160 (Ind. and Office REITs)
161 (Retail REITs)
163 (Diversified REITs)
164 (Specialty REITs)
167 (Real Estate Services)
10 Others
(Mean CSP score = 63.43)
32 (Industrial Suppliers)
44 (Defence)
48 (Personal Products)
74 (Renewable Energy Equipment)
86 (Business Support)
98 (Aerospace)
101 (Diversified Industrials)
132 (Medical Equipment)
134 (Business Training and
Employment)
156 (Consumer Services)
157 (Biotechnology)
This classification is adapted from UK Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities 2007
Table 14 Definitions of Variables
Variable Abbreviation Description Data source
Corporate
social
performance
CSP Corporate social performance obtained from the module
‘ASSET4 Environmental, Social and Corporate
Governance Data’. This is described as ‘‘the social
pillar measures a company’s capacity to generate trust
and loyalty with its workforce, customers and society,
through its use of best management practices. It is a
reflection of the company’s reputation and the health
of its license to operate, which are key factors in
determining its ability to generate long term
shareholder value.’’
Datastream-
Worldscope
Return on
assets
ROA Operating income divided by total assets Datastream-
Worldscope
Return on
equity
ROE Net income divided by common equity Datastream-
Worldscope
Share price
performance
SPP Natural logarithm differences between adjusted share
prices at time t and t – 1
Datastream-
Worldscope
Firm beta BETA Is the CAPM’s historical beta coefficient. We compute
annual beta for each firm using rolling time series
regressions of excess company returns with respect to
the FTSE All-Share Index returns using monthly data
for the past 5 years
Datastream-
Worldscope
Total assets
(firm size)
SIZE The natural logarithm of deflated total assets Datastream-
Worldscope
Table 14 continued
Variable Abbreviation Description Data source
Research and
development
RD Research and development expenses divided by total
sales
Datastream-
Worldscope
Current ratio CUR Current assets divided by current liabilities Datastream-
Worldscope
Leverage LEVER Total debt divided by total assets Datastream-
Worldscope
Current growth GROWTH Percentage change in annual sales Datastream-
Worldscope
Market-to-book
ratio
MBR The ratio of ‘total assets plus market value of equity less
book value of equity’ to total assets. Market value and
book value dates are matched
Datastream-
Worldscope
Managerial
ownership
MANOW Percentage of the number of shares held by insiders as
executives and top-line managers in total shares
outstanding
Thomson
Reuters
EIKON
